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Security and International Law: the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
Alexandra Bohm* 
I Introduction  
One of the most significant areas of security and international law is that of threats to the 
security of individuals. As this book deals elsewhere with the concept of ‘human security’, 
this chapter is dedicated to one particular conception of how to address the threats to 
individual security posed by mass atrocity crimes – the doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(RtP). RtP was born in 20011 with the publication of a report by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)2 aimed at being a comprehensive doctrine 
capable of overcoming the deadlock between state sovereignty/non-intervention and human 
rights, which had characterised the humanitarian intervention debate in previous decades, due 
to its broader understanding of security crises.3 RtP’s core idea is the primary responsibility of 
a state towards the security of its population and the secondary responsibility of the 
international community in this regard. The idea has undergone several ‘evolutions’ from its 
promulgation in 2001, through the General Assembly’s adoption of parts of the ICISS report 
in its World Summit Outcome Document in 2005,4 to the Secretary General’s Report on the 
implementation of the doctrine in 2009.5 These evolutions have demonstrated areas of clear 
                                                          
* Teaching Fellow, University of Birmingham. This chapter has benefitted from comments by Dr Garrett Brown 
and Dr Richard Collins, as well as discussions at the following conferenc s: ILA British Branch Annual 
Conference 2012 (University of Nottingham); Responsibility to Protect in Theory and in Practice 2013 
(University of Ljubljana); Beyond the Responsibility to Protect: Towards Re ponsible Use of International Law 
2013 (University of Hull). Parts of this chapter – especially s3 – draw upon A Bohm, ‘Responding to Crises: the 
Problematic Relationship between Security and Justice in the Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 4 Global Policy 
247-257.  
1 The idea of sovereignty as responsibility towards a state’s own citizens was first introduced in 1996 in the 
context of refugees – see especially: F Deng et al, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa 
(Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1996). 
2 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottowa, International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
3 For references to this ‘deadlock’ see, eg: K Annan, Millennium Development Report to the 55th Session of the 
UNGA (5 September 2000) UN Fact Sheet DP1/2083/Rev.1; ICISS (n 2) foreword vii. 
4 UNGA, ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ UN GA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) (Outcome Document). 
5 B Ki-moon, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary General’ UNGA 63rd session 
(12 January 2009) UN doc A/63/677. 
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consensus between states and also areas where issues are clearly unresolved and lacking 
international consensus on human protection.  
This chapter addresses some of these issues by xploring the role of the RtP doctrine 
in providing security to vulnerable individuals. It does so in the light of the book’s two main 
questions – whether international law can address the types of security risks that threaten our 
existence in the 21st Century and where and how international law might fall short in meeting 
the problems that arise in situations of insecurity. To answer these questions, the chapter 
critically engages with RtP, examining how it constructs the nature of insecurity and what 
assumptions are made about the role of international law in providing security. Section II  
introduces the idea of ‘responsibility to protect’ and its development. Section III examines 
some key assumptions underpinning RtP. The first assumption is the very foundation of RtP – 
that the internal crises in which mass atrocity crimes occur are the key threat to individual 
security today. The second assumption is that because these crises are associated with weak, 
failing or non-democratic regimes, domestic governance reform is the most important crisis-
prevention strategy. The third assumption is that, given that the fault lies with the government 
that has failed to protect its people, the international community’s role is to respond by 
rescuing those at risk, should prevention fail. Section IV argues that these assumptions 
provide an incomplete picture of the situations of insecurity in which mass atrocity crimes 
occur and, thus, give a faulty analysis of suitable prevention measures. It criticises RtP’s 
assumptions for neglecting more chronic socio-economic problems, related to violence and 
insecurity, and consequent mass abuses of civil and political rights. Related to this implicit 
decoupling of socio-economic from civil and political rights, this section also argues that RtP 
insufficiently addresses the role of the international community in actually contributing to the 
sorts of crises that RtP attempts to address. Section V considers the place of RtP in 
international law and relates arguments about RtP to those concerning international law’s 
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‘fitness for purpose’ in addressing security threats in the 21st Century more generally. Some 
concluding thoughts are then offered. 
 
II The Development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine  
RtP has been discussed widely following the ICISS report, including in the UN High Level 
Panel Report of 20046 and various more recent reports by the Secretary General. This section 
discusses the three most detailed iterations of the RtP concept in order to understand how it 
has developed and which of its concepts remain problematic: the ICISS Report of 2001, the 
UN World Summit in 2005 and the Secretary General’s implementation report of 2009. 
 
A The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 
The 2001 ICISS report was commissioned by the Canadian Government to find a way 
forward from the state sovereignty-human rights deadlock, which had characterised the earlier 
humanitarian intervention debate.7 Having met with a wide range of actors, including NGOs, 
governments and civil society groups, the Commission produced a detailed report covering 
the changing international context of security threats; changes in the terms of the 
humanitarian intervention debate and the meaning of sovereignty; the three ‘pillars’ of 
responsibility (to prevent, to react and to rebuild); together with operational issues relating to 
military intervention, including the question of Security Council authority. Finally, the report 
ended with thoughts for the ‘way forward’ from the analysis therein to action in the future.8 
The changing international context includes new security issues, such as the increase in intra-
state conflicts frequently associated with weak states and frequently involving high civilian 
                                                          
6 UN, ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’ Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change (29 November 2004) UN Doc A/59/565.  
7 ICISS (n 2) 2. 
8 ICISS (n 2) 69. 
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casualties.9 At the same time, the report comments that, since the end of World War II, 
international law has increasingly become concerned with protecting the individual through 
increasing numbers of human rights treaties (including the Genocide Convention and various 
more general human rights conventions).10 In this context, the report notes that a principle is 
emerging of intervention for human protection purposes – including military intervention in 
extreme cases of major harm to civilians.11 In light of this, the Commission recommended 
changing the terms of the debate from a ‘right to intervene’ to a ‘responsibility to protect’, 
focusing on the victims rather than the interveners and encompassing a broader responsibility 
than just that of military intervention.12 The core principle of the report is that ‘[w]here a 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’.13  The ICISS report did not 
receive an immediate response from the international community, but was debated four years 
later by the General Assembly as part of its World Summit. 
 
B The United Nations General Assembly World Summit 2005 
In two paragraphs of its ‘Outcome Document’, the General Assembly endorsed the key 
principle of RtP in its 2005 World Summit.14 Paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document refers 
to states’ responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, and encourages the international community to assist 
states in exercising this responsibility.15 Paragraph 139 acknowledges the responsibility of the 
international community to help protect populations against these crimes. It notes that this 
                                                          
9 See ICISS (n 2) 4. 
10 ICISS (n 2) 6 para 1.25, 14. 
11 ICISS (n 2) 16 para 2.25.  
12 ICISS (n 2) 17, para 2.29; G Evans, ‘Responsibility to Protect: an idea whose time has come...and gone?’ 
(2008) 22 Intl Relations 283. 
13 ICISS (n 2) xi. 
14 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4). 
15 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4) para 138. 
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responsibility is to be carried out peacefully in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
UN Charter or, if necessary, by acting collectively through the Security Council and Chapter 
VII, on a case-by-case basis, where a state is ‘manifestly failing’ in its protective duty. It also 
recommends that the General Assembly continue to consider the responsibility to protect 
populations, ‘bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law’.16 Although 
this has been hailed as a revolutionary norm, 17 the Outcome Document is a somewhat 
cautious approach to the detailed content of the full ICISS report, such as in its reference to 
the option of General Assembly-mandated action,18 or to the suggestion made by ‘a senior 
representative of one of the Permanent Five countries’ that the Security Council’s ‘P5’ might 
refrain from using their veto power.19 Nevertheless, it seems that the idea of both states and 
the international community having a responsibility towards individuals at risk from mass 
atrocities has been accepted by the General Assembly, which instructed Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon to continue to report on the matter. 
 
C Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009  
One of the results of the General Assembly’s request to the Secretary General was the report 
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, produced in 2009.20 The report suggests a three-
pillar strategy for implementing the responsibility to protect (different from the pillars in the 
2001 report of prevention, reaction and rebuilding). These are: the state’s responsibility to 
protect (pillar 1); the international community’s responsibility to assist, especially with 
capacity-building (pillar 2); and the need for a timely and decisive response to a crisis (pillar 
                                                          
16 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4) para 139. 
17 See, eg, R Cooper and J Kohler, Responsibility to Protect: Global Moral Compact (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005); N Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 
World Summit' (2005) 2 J Intl L Intl Relations 95, 97. 
18 ICISS (n 2) 48 para 6.7; 53 paras 6.29-6.30. 
19 ICISS (n 2) 51 para 6.21. 
20 Ki -moon (n 5). 
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3).21 In relation to these pillars, the report suggests that RtP is about strengthening sovereignty 
through international assistance, rather than weakening it through intervention (coercive 
action is mentioned only briefly when Ki-moon encourages the P5 not to use their veto in RtP 
situations22). Prevention, through pillars 1 and 2, is viewed by the report to be critical.23 
Nevertheless, the 2009 report does deal with the issue of intervention and, in doing so, seems 
to be at odds with the 2001 ICISS report’s understanding of sequencing, which uses ‘just war’ 
criteria to guide the decision on when military intervention might be appropriate.24 In contrast 
to ICISS’ endorsement of the need for military intervention to be a last resort, Ki-moon’s 
report argues that there is no need for a chronological sequencing of the different possible RtP 
responses and that the UN should not prize procedure over results.25 Thus, at times, the 
Secretary General’s 2009 report appears more expansive than the 2001 ICISS report on the 
use of force, at other times its focus is less on military intervention.  
 
D RtP Now 
From these documents, key unresolved areas of RtP can be seen to centre on the need for a 
chronological sequence of actions before military intervention is used as a last resort and on 
the use of the veto by the P5 members of the Security Council. These points will be returned 
to later, when considering the issue of military intervention and the relationship of RtP with 
international law. The point to be made now is that, notwithstanding these unresolved issues, 
it is claimed that RtP’s supporters ‘have won the battle of ideas’.26 Certainly the General 
Assembly has continued to debate the matter after the World Summit and encouraged the 
                                                          
21 Ki -moon (n 5) 2. Pillar 2 has also been understood more in terms of rebuilding – see A Nollkaemper and J 
Hoffmann, Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam, P llas, 2012) 15. 
22 Ki -moon (n 5) 27 para 61. 
23 Ki -moon (n 5) 9 para 11b. 
24 ICISS (n 2) 32 para 4.16; 36 paras 4.37, 4.38. 
25 ICISS (n 2) 22; Ki-moon (n 5) 9 para 12, 22 para 50. The ICISS does recognise the difficulty of the ‘last 
resort’ concept, but nevertheless emphasises the need for caution before military intervention. 
26 So claims Simon Adams (the Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, a 
major RtP NGO), see S Adams, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ speech to opening plenary session of the 
Responsibility to Protect in Theory and in Practice Conference (11-12 April 2013) Ljubljana. 
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Secretary General to continue to report back on relevant issues, including reports on ‘early 
warning and assessment’27 and ‘a timely and decisive response’.28 Scholars have also noted 
that RtP has been hailed as coming of age in recent years.29 Others have praised it as being a 
‘crucial concept’,30 ‘the most dramatic normative development of our time’31 and a valuable 
tool in raising awareness of our collective responsibility to protect individuals from certain 
types of insecurity and violence.32  With recent references to RtP in Security Council 
resolutions in relation to the situation in Libya,33 it appears that the international community 
has now largely accepted the overall concept of RtP, if not all of its details and operational 
issues. The next section examines the provisions of RtP more closely, identifying what 
assumptions RtP makes about how situations of insecurity arise and how they are best dealt 
with, in particular the roles played by the ‘unable or unwilling’ irresponsible state and by the 
‘international community’ of responsible states. 
 
III The Concept of ‘(in)security’ in the Responsibility to Protect  
Quite clearly, RtP is designed to address situations in which civilians suffer grave harm at the 
hands, or through the neglect, of their government that has failed in its primary responsibility 
towards its population. The 2001 report refers to this failure as the state having the primary 
responsibility and being unable or unwilling to fulfil it.34 The 2005 Outcome Document refers 
                                                          
27 B Ki-moon, ‘Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect’ (14 July 2010) UN Doc A/64/864. 
28 B Ki-moon, ‘Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response’ (25 July 2012) UN Doc A/66/874-
S/2012/578. 
29 See, eg A Orford, ‘Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 24 EJIL 83. 
30 N Wheeler and F Egerton, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Precious Commitment’ or a Promise Unfulfilled?’ 
(2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 114. 
31 R Thakur and T Weiss, ‘R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 22. 
32 See, eg R Cohen, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Rights and Humanitarian Dimensions’ Harvard 
Human Rights Journal Annual Symposium (20 February 2009); S Adams, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ speech to 
opening plenary session of the Responsibility to Protect in Theory and in Practice Conference (11-12 April 
2013) Ljubljana. 
33 See, eg UNSC Res 1973 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. Other situations have also merited a reference to RtP, 
such as Syria – see, eg UNSC Res 2042 (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042; UN GA Res A/HRC/RES/S-16/1; 
UN GA Res A/RES/66/176; UN GA Res A/RES/66/253, all urging the Syrian Government to protect its 
population. 
34 ICISS (n 2) foreword viii. 
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to the state’s ‘manifest failure’ to protect its population.35 The ICISS report notes that millions 
are at risk of atrocities and RtP is designed to deliver ‘practical protection for ordinary people, 
at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them’.36 This role 
of the state towards its own citizens is reflected in pillar 1 of the 2009 report, which notes that 
‘it is the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations ... from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement’.37 RtP is thus 
designed to be a narrow doctrine, addressing only these mass atrocity crimes and the local 
government’s role in carrying them out or in failing to prevent them.38 The doctrine is also 
designed to be ‘deep’ because, although the focus of RtP claims to be on prevention, flexible 
responses to crises also involve a ‘wide array of protection and prevention instruments’ from 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.39 
RtP’s definition of insecurity relates specifically to threats from (or failures of) the 
citizens’ own government in relation to the civil and political rights of the state’s own citizens 
(limited to the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing). Again, clearly, the very existence of the doctrine assumes that something 
can be done about mass atrocity crimes specifically, with RtP specifying that it is Chapter VI, 
VII and VIII measures that are appropriate. This is discussed further in the next subsection on 
the causes of crises. 
 
A The cause of threats to individual security 
Perhaps unsurprisingly for a report that deals with grave civil and political rights abuses, the 
2001 ICISS report relates the primary causes of conflicts or state collapse to failures in 
                                                          
35 UNGA, Outcome Document (n 4) para 139. 
36 ICISS (n 2) 11 para 2.1. 
37 Ki -moon (n 5) 8 para 11.a. 
38 Ki -moon (n 5) 8 para 10.b. 
39 Ki -moon (n 5) 8 para 10.c; A Dieng, Secr tary General’s Special Representative for Genocide, Opening 
Speech to Responsibility to Protect in Theory and in Practice Conference (11-12 April 2013) Ljubljana. 
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domestic governance – in particular, commenting that a ‘firm national commitment to 
ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens provides a solid basis for conflict 
prevention’.40 The 2009 report comments that populations will be at risk if ‘national political 
leadership is weak, divided or uncertain about how to proceed’ (for example, against rebels).41 
It also deplores the lack of education and training on human rights in states at risk from RtP 
crimes.42 Mass atrocity crimes are therefore taken to be caused by the government responsible 
for the civil and political rights of its citizens. 43 Mass atrocities being the fault of the 
government, RtP then considers the role of the international community in response to 
national governance failures. It is to this that the next section turns. 
 
B The international community’s role in enabling security  
i Prevention and Assistance 
The international community’s secondary responsibility to protect populations at risk from 
mass atrocity crimes involves helping states prevent crimes on their territory and responding 
to the commission of such crimes should preventive efforts fail. RtP recommends that the 
international community help local efforts to identify triggers of conflict44 and support local 
human rights and good governance initiatives45 to strengthen national governance. The 
international community’s assistance to states should be through diplomatic encouragement, 
human rights training and other governance capacity building assistance,46 by UN Special 
Advisors and the Bretton Woods institutions,47 or through rule of law and other human rights 
issues being addressed in existing aid programmes.48  
                                                          
40 ICISS (n 2) 19 para 3.2.  
41 Ki -moon (n 5) 15 para 29. 
42 Ki -moon (n 5) 16 para 33. 
43 Ki -moon (n 5) 12; ICISS (n 2) 11, 19. 
44 ICISS (n 2) 19 para 3.4. 
45 ICISS (n 2) 19 para 3.3. 
46 Ki -moon (n 5) 15 para 29-30; 20 para 44.  
47 Ki -moon (n 5) 15 para 30. 
48 ICISS (n 2) 27 para 3.41; Ki-moon (n 5) 21 para 47. 
10 
 
ii Reaction and Response   
If the international community’s preventive efforts fail and a crisis develops, the international 
community must then exercise its responsibility to react. This responsibility can be fulfilled 
using economic, political and legal, as well as military, means.49 ICISS acknowledges that 
sanctions can be a blunt instrument and, as such, it may be necessary to consider military 
action. 50  ICISS devotes significant space to endorsing ‘just war’ criteria to assess the 
legitimacy of a military response. 51 The 2009 report refers to the broad range of tools 
available under the Security Council’s Chapter VI, VII and VIII powers, as well as the role of 
the General Assembly,52 diplomatic sanctions and arms control.53 The report notes, however, 
that given the widely different circumstances in which mass atrocity crimes occur, ‘there is no 
room for a rigidly sequenced strategy or for tightly defined ‘triggers’ for action’. 54  A 
significant role of the international community is therefore envisaged by RtP, both in helping 
states improve weak domestic governance for conflict prevention and in responding to 
domestic failures with a variety of measures. 
RtP’s key assumptions about threats to security outlined above focus on the state-
citizen relationship and the national government’s duty not to abuse its citizens’ civil and 
political rights. Adhering to liberal scholar Fernando Teson’  view that ‘a major purpose of 
states and governments is to protect and secure human rights’, RtP envisages a cosmopolitan 
role for the international community whose human rights obligations to individuals 
everywhere can require it to rescue individuals from gross human rights abuses55 and to 
                                                          
49 ICISS (n 2) 19. 
50 ICISS (n 2) 29. 
51 ICISS (n 2) 32-37 para 4.18-4.43. 
52 Ki -moon (n 2) 8-9 para 11c; 22 para 49. 
53 Ki -moon (n 2) 25 paras 57, 58. 
54 Ki -moon (n 5) 22 para 50. 
55 F Teson, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ in J Holzgrefe and R Keohane (eds), Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 93; see 
also F Teson, ‘Collective Humanitarian Intervention’ (1995-1996) 17 Michigan J Intl L 323, 342. 
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encourage weak national governments not to abuse their populations in the first place. The 
next section goes on to demonstrate that RtP contains an impoverished conception of the role 
of the international community in the security of individuals in other states and, therefore, it 
cannot successfully address insecurity and violence. 
 
IV Security and Responsibility: an alternative conception 
This section will address RtP’s construction of the nature of security threats by suggesting an 
alternative understanding of these threats. It critiques the very need for a doctrine focused on 
mass atrocity crimes because such a doctrine inevitably assumes that the ‘international 
community’ is well-placed to rescue people from this particular type of insecurity, rather than 
having a role in creating systemic causes of insecurity. The alternative conception of 
insecurity offered below links socio-economic development to security more explicitly than 
RtP does, arguing that, without adequately addressing this issue (and the international 
community’s role in contributing to the causes of insecurity), the international community can 
only ever respond to the symptoms, and not the causes, of insecurity. 
 
A The Importance of Mass Atrocity Crimes   
This section contends that, while horrific, mass atrocity crimes are not necessarily the primary 
insecurity faced by vulnerable populations today. Creating a doctrine to enable urgent 
responses to these particular crimes elevates the importance of certain types of death over 
other types, without justification, and risks adding to the injustices suffered by the most 
vulnerable people by drawing attention away from equally important, and related, situations 
of insecurity. Some statistics highlight this point. There are 18 million poverty-related deaths 
annually, with 2,000 million people lacking access to basic drugs, 2,500 million lacking 
access to basic sanitation, 1,020 million chronically undernourished and 34 million people 
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suffering from HIV and AIDS.56 This contrasts with the 1998 statistics of 588,000 deaths from 
war and 736,000 from social violence57 and, of course, the famous death toll numbers of 
800,000 in Rwanda and suggestions of 100,000 in Syria. Alex Bellamy describes this issue as 
‘structural violence’, rather than organised military violence, being the main contemporary 
problem facing humanity.58 In this regard, he contrasts ‘death by politics’ (state sponsored 
killing) with ‘death by economics’ (such as starvation). The latter is somehow seen as being 
outside the interest or responsibility of international law and the ‘international community.59  
The perception of mass atrocity crimes as the most urgent security issue reflects a 
tendency of international lawyers to focus on crises, rather than on systemic chronic issues, 
and thus not consider the relationship between the two. As Hilary Charlesworth notes, ‘using 
crises as our focus means that what we generally take for ‘fundamental’ questions and 
enquiries are very restricted’.60 Sundya Pahuja describes this phenomenon as ‘the power of a 
question to define an outcome’61 – if mass atrocity crimes are posed as the most urgent 
security threat to individuals, the outcome of a doctrine to deal with them seems natural. RtP 
succumbs to this crisis-focus, both in its very existence and in its limited acknowledgement 
that ‘global justice’ can be related to mass atrocity crimes. A focus on the more chronic 
problems outlined above would suggest that if we have a responsibility towards individuals in 
other states (as Teson suggests), it should include not just responding to crises in which mass 
atrocity crimes may occur, but also responding to the significant numbers suffering from these 
chronic problems. RtP does not explain why the ‘millions’ suffering from state repression and 
collapse are in need of a doctrine to help them, compared to the greater number of people 
                                                          
56 H Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377, 391; T 
Pogge, ‘Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-poor Rhetoric?’ Yale University Lecture (2010) 12-13.  
57 A Hurrell, Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 42. See also 
A Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society’ (2003) 29 
Review of International Studies 320, 329. 
58 Bellamy (n 57) 329. 
59 Bellamy (n 57) 332. 
60Charlesworth (n 56) 377. 
61 S Pahuja, ‘Don't just do something, stand there! Humanitarian intervention and the drowning stranger’ (2005) 
5 Human Rights & Human Welfare 51. 
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dying from poverty-related causes. The existence of a doctrine addressing mass atrocities also 
suggests that they are a separate act or acts, unrelated to other global problems. This does not 
enable a comprehensive understanding of the situations in which mass violence occurs. 
Proponents such as Adama Dieng (the Secretary General’s Special Representative for 
the Prevention of Genocide) argue that RtP is supposed to be a narrow doctrine and so 
benefits from this limited focus.62 Gareth Evans (one of ICISS’ co-chairs) describes this as 
limiting the doctrine to ‘extreme, conscience-shocking cases’.63 This may calm the fears of 
those who see RtP as expanding the number of situations when it is acceptable to use military 
force, but, in more general terms, it does not explain why the deaths of 18 million human 
beings from poverty is not as conscience-shocking. Whilst efforts addressing 
underdevelopment and efforts addressing mass atrocity crimes are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, there is a real risk that the focus on mass atrocity crimes will draw attention, effort 
and, crucially, funds away from causes, such as global health and poverty, and towards the 
defence industry and military intervention. Even if mass atrocity crimes are the major 
problem of our time, more conscience-shocking than the 18 million poverty-related deaths 
every year, RtP still neglects the relationship between atrocities and more chronic problems. 
The focus on crimes occurring during crises reflects a prioritising of certain civil and political 
rights over other human rights. Scholars frequently refer to ‘fundamental’ human rights,64 
without explaining whether all human rights are fundamental (as the term ‘human’ would 
imply) or whether some rights are more fundamental than others – though Holzgrefe and 
Keohane’s reference to the word ‘fundamental’ rights in their definition of humanitarian 
                                                          
62 Dieng (n 39). The limited focus of RtP is a source of criticism for some who believe there is no justification 
for the choice of its 4 crimes, which are not necessarily obviously related in rms of causes and, possibly, 
appropriate responses – see, eg, A Gallagher, Genocide and its Threat to Contemporary International Order 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave 2013) 7. 
63 Evans (n 12). 
64 See, eg T Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 AJIL 1; WM Reisman, 
‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’ (1990) 84 AJIL 866, 872; P Malanczuk, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force (Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993); M Kahler, 
‘Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Institutions’ (2011) 10 Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 20. 
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intervention suggests that only those rights triggering an intervention are the fundamental 
ones.65 This issue warrants further discussion, which takes place below.  
 
B The cause of crises: civil and political vs socio-economic rights  
The primary importance of certain civil and political rights stems from the ‘triumph of 
liberalism’66 at the end of the Cold War and the declining influence of socialism and socio-
economic rights. At this time, liberal international lawyers and others began to champion 
democracy and civil and political rights. For example, Thomas Franck comments that, in 
relation to coup attempts in Haiti and Russia, ‘the international community vigorously 
asserted that only democracy validates governance’.67 Teson asserts that anarchy and tyranny 
(non-democracy) are the worst forms of injustice because it is in these conditions that evils, 
such as genocide, are perpetrated.68 In addition, John Rawls’ theory of justice focuses more on 
the civil and political arena than socio-economic issues – equality of civil and political 
opportunities can never be compromised and increased socio-economic equality is not a 
justification for civil and political inequalities.69  
In a similar vein, RtP relates insecurity strictly to the government’s failure to protect 
its people’s civil and political rights.70 It constructs the biggest threat to individual security as 
mass abuses of civil and political rights and constructs the blame for abuse to lie with the 
government when those rights are violated on a grand scale. Although one paragraph of the 
2001 report by ICISS does refer to the role of Cold War debts and the trade policies of richer 
countries in preventing poorer states from addressing some of the root causes of conflicts, 
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such as poverty,71 it then ties these causes back to the civil and political rights arena of 
national democratic participation and national responsibility, suggesting that national poverty 
and inequality is to be solved by national good governance.72 Very little of the 2001 report 
considers the potential ‘direct’ responsibility of the international community for socio-
economic underdevelopment in poorer countries (rather than viewing national political 
constitution as responsible for socio-economic development).73 The 2009 report is slightly 
more promising in this regard, referring to aid and development as part of conflict prevention 
in stronger terms than ICISS does. But this report still largely sees the relationship the other 
way round, noting (no doubt correctly) that mass atrocity crimes halt development, such as 
tourism and capital investment.74   
There is, therefore, a significant disparity between civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights in RtP. This disparity is worrying in itself, given the number of people 
suffering from poverty and RtP’s claimed cosmopolitan concern for ‘a humanity that cares 
more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to 
end it’. 75  It is also worrying because development and security are related – 
underdevelopment and poverty contribute significantly to violence and instability. Kofi Annan 
highlights the general importance of socio-economic development when commenting that ‘a 
young man with AIDS who cannot read or write and lives on the brink of starvation is not 
truly free.’76 Thomas Pogge points to the inability of severely poor citizens to combat corrupt 
and anti-democratic governments. 77  James Richardson suggests that ‘Arbitrary acts of 
violence against the underprivileged, or acts of omission such as the dispossession without 
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restitution of those who inadvertently stand in the way of ‘development’’ are just as important 
as ‘negative’ rights (which are the focus of RtP).78 Fearon and Laitin found that poverty was a 
key factor contributing to civil war and Suzuki and Krause found that economic development 
reduced the risk of civil war.79 RtP’s national civil-political focus is in contrast to the General 
Comments issued by the Committee on Cultural, Economic and Social Rights, which suggest 
that all states must respect the economic, social and cultural rights of individuals in other 
countries – this appears to go unnoticed by RtP and its proponents.80  
In RtP terms, a national commitment to good governance and political participation 
and representative governance is of limited value if, for example, an individual cannot read 
the ballot papers or is dying of starvation and so unlikely to have an investment in their future. 
This means that RtP’s commitment to protecting vulnerable individuals from abuses is rather 
empty without a prior commitment to the socio-economic rights that strengthen the ability of 
citizens to meaningfully participate in democracy and good governance measures – the high-
level human rights training in prevention is of little use if individuals cannot exercise these 
rights ‘on the ground’. There is strong evidence that development contributes significantly to 
security and conflict prevention, suggesting that the structural violence of inequality and 
poverty is prior to outbreaks of military violence. 81  In order to be meaningful, the 
international community’s responsibility to protect, whether in ICISS’ terms of prevention or 
Ki-moon’s terms of assistance, should include a genuine commitment to development and 
poverty alleviation. The idea of the international community’s duty to assist states in 
preventing abuse suggests that the international community’s relationship with problem states 
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is currently neutral, being neither a help nor a hindrance. If the blame for these crises lies with 
the local government, then, in response to a failure at the national level, it is logical that the 
international community could perceive a need for action in response. 82 A further issue 
meriting consideration is the degree of responsibility already borne by the international 
community in contributing to underdevelopment, violence and insecurity. The chapter now 
links socio-economic issues to the role of the international community in crises, challenging 
its role as rescuer. 
 
C The role of the international community in insecurity – to the rescue? 
In response to Bellamy’s description of an international community which shows more 
concern for death by politics than by economics, this section demonstrates that the 
international community contributes significantly to ‘death by economics’. Because this 
socio-economic insecurity is related to acts of violence, the international community therefore 
contributes to much of the violence within the states, which are then perceived to be unwilling 
or unable to fulfil their responsibility to protect. The idea that rich states contribute to the 
underdevelopment of poor states is not new. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
engage fully with development literature, it is at least plausible that rich country development 
policies are not helping the global poor, with loan conditions that increase inequality and 
decrease education, welfare and employment, for example, during the 1990s, developed 
countries reduced their development assistance by 27%.83 Thomas Pogge also points to the 
asymmetrical global trading regime that allows rich countries to favour their companies 
through tariffs, quotas and subsidies, at an estimated cost to poor countries of $700 billion, 
                                                          
82 WM Reisman, ‘Some Lessons From Iraq: International Law and Domestic Politics’ (1991) 16 Yale J Intl L 
203, 203; L Gordenker and T Weiss, ‘The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics’ in T Weiss 
(ed), Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 1993) 14; Teson, ‘Collective 
Humanitarian Intervention’ (n 55) 342;  
83 T Pogge, ‘Priorities of global justice’ (2001) 32 Metaphilosophy 6, 7, citing UNDP, Development Report 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 218.  
18 
whilst poor countries struggle to obtain affordable generic drugs and crop seeds as a result of 
the market access conditions imposed upon them by rich countries.84 Because socio-economic 
underdevelopment has been shown in section IV B as being linked to violence and conflict, 
the international community’s responsibility for socio-economic injustice means that they 
have a responsibility for contributing to the violence from which they wish to rescue people. 
Two examples demonstrate these points well. In the Balkan crisis, Anne Orford argues 
that the key threats to peace were viewed to be local historical ethnic tensions; set against the 
local cause of threats, the question for international actors was that of rescue.85 In contrast to 
this view of threats to individuals, Orford points out the contribution made by the economic 
liberalisation project of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to the increasing 
instability in, and eventual violent breakup of, the former Yugoslavia. She notes that before 
the two international financial institutions’ (IFI) interventions into the country, the different 
Yugoslavian provinces had been able to coexist peacefully with a degree of autonomy from 
the central government, without perceiving a need for full separation. The IFIs required the 
central government to enact constitutional changes, which increased centralised control at the 
expense of autonomous regions, as well as decreasing education opportunities and reducing 
constitutional protections for workers.86 This led to a decrease in income per capita, increased 
unemployment and attendant social unrest, together with a perception within the various 
regions that independence would be necessary to be able to reverse the damaging social 
changes introduced by the central government and the IFIs. 87  Pre-existing nationalist 
sentiments had previously been managed through regional autonomy, but were fuelled by the 
increasing sense of insecurity, instability and social exclusion resulting from the constitutional 
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reforms and increased centralisation decreed by the IFIs. This is a very different, and more 
complex, picture than that of purely local factions fighting for local reasons, with the only 
question for the international community being whether or not it should intervene to protect 
individuals at risk from local violence. 
The problematic role of the international community in intra-state violence can also be 
demonstrated in Rwanda, where Belgium’s colonial policy of elevating Tutsis to senior 
economic positions at the expense of the Hutu population is said to have led to many of the 
ethnic tensions that led to the genocide in 1994.88 Rwanda’s exposure to the international 
market in coffee and the economic problems caused by the collapse in coffee prices is also 
said to have contributed significantly to the tensions through rapid increases in poverty and 
resulting social unrest.89 Far from helping prevent instability and violenc, international aid 
agencies and development programs are also alleged to have contributed to th  ‘s ructural 
violence’ of poverty, inequality and humiliation of the local population, which was largely 
excluded from meani gful participation in decisions (and jobs) in the development process.90 
Mahmood Mamdani goes even further than suggesting that colonialism contributed to ethnic 
tension, arguing that in Rwanda and Darfur colonialism actually created racial differences 
that would not otherwise have existed in these countries.91 Whether Mamdani is correct or 
not, it is difficult to deny the link between these non-military interventions (whether overtly 
colonial or through the practices of IFIs) that leave countries impoverished and acts of 
violence that spring from such impoverishment.  This link does not mean that those carrying 
out acts of violence should not bear any responsibility for their actions; but if RtP really aims 
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to prevent violence, or react usefully to it, then it cannot ignore the broader context in which 
violence occurs or the wider range of actors responsible for violence.  B llamy concurs that 
focusing on the need for acts of ‘intervention’ ensures that military interventions are 
perceived as discrete acts, rather than a different part of the spectrum of the international 
community’s historical, ongoing, long term involvement in ‘problem’ states.92  
This section has suggested that the international community is a significant contributor 
to violence taking place in the countries that RtP deems incapable of protecting their citizens. 
This calls into question RtP’s genuine commitment to root cause prevention as it is merely 
addressing the symptoms. The result of focusing on symptoms over causes is the perceived 
importance of military intervention in response to these symptoms – it is to this issue that the 
chapter now turns.  
 
D RtP’s Unanswered Questions: a return to ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
Section II  noted the unresolved issues in RtP surrounding military intervention – ‘just war’ 
questions of last resort and the right authority to sanction/permit action. Despite its claimed 
focus on prevention and protection for victims, rather than the ‘rights’ of interveners, and 
wider approach than purely military intervention,93 the ICISS report devotes 13 pages on 
military issues – far more than on root cause prevention or responses other than military 
action, such as diplomacy and sanctions. Ironically, it suggests that military action might be 
appropriate because sanctions can be a blunt instrument.94 The 2009 report takes the question 
of military intervention further (though less of the report is focused on the topic), stressing 
that chronological sequencing of responses i  not necessary in response to a crisis, so that 
military intervention does not have to be a last resort.  
                                                          
92 Bellamy (n 57) 329. See also A de Waal, ‘Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2007) 83 
Intl Affairs 1039. 
93 Evans (n 12) 285. 
94 ICISS (n 2) 29 para 4.5. 
21 
This focus on military action is troubling for two reasons. First, it risks neglecting a 
true commitment to prevention (particularly the long term socio-economic issues outlined 
above). Second, if it is agreed that military intervention does not have to be a last resort in 
particular ‘worst case’ scenarios, it becomes all too easy to view each crisis as one of the 
‘worst case’ scenarios requiring immediate military action. The idea that one needs to decide 
what to do in these difficult, worst case situations, presumes that we are already willing, able 
committed and actually doing everything else in the non-worst case scenarios, with the only 
remaining problem being the few worst cases. A similar situation arises in relation to the need 
for Security Council authorisation – it becomes easy to view any veto as illegitimate because 
it prevents a perceived-necessary military response, without considering that perhaps a veto 
might suggest that it is the proposed military response that is, in fact, illegitimate. For 
example, the Russian and Chinese vetoes of action in response to the Syrian crisis might not 
necessarily be illegitimate simply because they have the effect of preventing military action. 
Given the controversy surrounding the Libyan intervention and subsequent regime change, as 
well as the war crimes committed by the National Transitional Council, a resulting reluctance 
to authorise further military interventions is unsurprising.95 This repeated return to the issue of 
military action at the expense of serious long term prevention efforts suggests that RtP and 
humanitarian intervention are not ‘very different concepts’ as Gareth Evans has argued.96 In 
fact, Thomas Weiss comments that ‘the acknowledgment by the 2005 World Summit ... has 
reinforced the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as a policy option’97 and even the 
ICISS report itself says that its report is about humanitarian intervention.98 To criticise the 
constant focus on military intervention is not to say that use of force can never be an 
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acceptable policy option. The point being made here is that the absence of a genuine 
commitment to doing everything that can be done, before contemplating military intervention, 
will mean that any use of force is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate. Doing ‘everything’ 
should not be taken to be diplomacy and sanctions in response to a crisis, but should also 
include a serious long-term commitment to poverty and inequality reduction as part of the 
international community’s responsibility towards vulnerable individuals. 
The ‘do something or do nothing’99 approach to military intervention in response to a 
crisis reflects the assumption highlighted in section IV C, that the international community is 
currently ‘doing nothing’ and has the option of ‘doing something’ (i.e. military intervention) 
to save people. Section IV ’s argument – that the international community is not in fact ‘doing 
nothing’ in relation to unstable states, but is in fact contributing to this instability – should 
suggest caution in endorsing the international community’s subsequent desire to ‘do 
something’ in response to outbreaks of violence.  These problems with RtP are important in 
their own right, but are particularly important in the wider context of international peace and 
security law more generally when considering arguments about the legal status of RtP. 
 
V The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: the problem with an ‘evolving 
norm’  
The relationship of the RtP doctrine to international law is far from settled, with a variety of 
descriptions attaching to the documents that go to make up RtP – a ‘concept’; an ‘idea’; a 
‘political push’; ‘political commitment’ or an ‘evolving norm’.100 Sceptics argue that RtP is a 
political and not a legal doctrine as it has not achieved customary status under international 
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law, any more than its predecessor concept of humanitarian intervention, and the General 
Assembly’s World Summit endorsement of RtP was very limited and only to the extent that 
the idea was in line with existing international law.101 Proponents argue that RtP is already 
part of international law, bringing together different strands of extant law on states’ human 
rights obligations to their own populations and to others (eg under the Genocide 
Convention),102 the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court and reports such as the 
2004 High Level Panel report on ‘Threats, Challenges and Change’ and the 2005 ‘In Larger 
Freedom’ report by Kofi Annan.103 This means that there is nothing new in RtP and it has not 
changed international peace and security law on the use of force. Using UN reform reports, in 
addition to more formal sources of international law, to argue that RtP is a coherent unified 
legal norm is controversial, but the fact that parts of RtP reflect existing international law may 
lend legitimacy to the concept.   
The idea that RtP is uncontroversial because it simply reflects existing international 
law sits uneasily with those aspects of RtP that seek to move beyond the existing legal 
framework – especially the need for UN Security Council authorisation for military 
intervention. An example of this is the thinking of Anne Peters, who admits that the legal 
status of RtP is not settled, but suggests that if RtP were a legal norm, then Security Council 
veto action could potentially be illegal and the P5 would be obliged to give reasons for any 
veto – something which she suggests may, in any event, be an existing procedural 
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obligation.104 The push for implementation of RtP, now that the ‘battle for ideas’ is apparently 
won,105 will be problematic if these key areas are not resolved. What exactly is to be 
implemented? The 2001 report’s just war criteria requiring military intervention to be a last 
resort, or Ki-moon’s suggestion that there is no need for a chronologically sequenced 
response? Nina Zupan laments that ‘the contestability of the [RtP] can indeed slow down and 
reduce the efficacy of its implementation’.106 However, the contested nature of key parts of 
RtP suggests that these are not ready to be implemented. If an idea has only achieved 
consensus on a limited number of points, then implementation should not push beyond this 
consensus – particularly not if relying on the level of consensus for legitimacy. ICISS 
mentions the suggestion that the Security Council P5 refrain from using their veto not as a 
consensus, but as an idea from one of the P5 representatives, one out of 193 member states of 
the UN, and the 2005 Outcome Document restates that RtP should be in line with existing 
international law.107 Military intervention without Security Council authorisation does not 
form part of the consensus on RtP and yet the 2009 report, and much debate on the topic, 
seems to presume that implementation of RtP requires a way to deal with the (presumed) 
illegitimate veto – any veto preventing military action must necessarily be illegitimate 
because it is preventing military action. 
Despite its ‘contestability’, the idea that the RtP doctrine is a necessary and welcome 
development permeates international legal discourse and relates to the idea that extant 
international (peace and security) law is not ‘fit for purpose’ in its ability to meet the security 
threats of the post-Cold War era.108 Gillian Triggs argues that generally ‘international law is 
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responding dynamically to the contemporary concern for the humanitarian needs of the 
individual’109 but is still not able to respond adequately, is still not fit for purpose, because it 
does not allow military intervention without Security Council authorisation.110 This idea that 
international law is not fit for purpose can be seen not just in relation to intervention for 
‘human protection’ purposes, but in other areas of law, including ‘cyber war’ and terrorism, 
where a threat is identified as too novel for existing law to be able to respond adequately.111 In 
counterpoint to calls to move international law ‘forward’ to enable a military response in RtP 
situations, others note that the rules prohibiting use of force exist for good reason and the 
migration of human rights issues away from multilateral resolution and into the area of peace 
and security, use of force, is problematic. Philip Alston argues that the focus on ad hoc 
interventions, in response to civil and political crises, allows the interveners to avoid 
supporting existing multilateral human rights promotion and protection regimes.112 Mary 
Ellen O’Connell notes that the risk of increasing the range of permissible uses of force is an 
overall increase in violence and instability.113 Brazil’s concept of ‘responsibility while 
protecting’ draws attention to the very high costs of an intervention, in terms of casualties and 
increased violence, aptly demonstrated in Kosovo when the NATO bombing campaign was 
said to increase ethnic cleansing during the ensuing chaos.114 ‘Fitness for purpose’ therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
... Recent events ... pose a challenge to the adequacy and coheren e of the law in this area’; at 6 he summarises 
the main question for the Committee as ‘Is international law adequate to the task required of it in contemporary 
international society?’ para 2.2 
109 G Triggs, ‘Public International Law: is it fit for purpose?’ (2007) 7 Legal Information Management 113, 118.  
110 Triggs (n 109) 119.  
111 On cyber war, see Chapter 15 of this volume and the special edition of he Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law, in particular M O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without Cyber War’ (2012) 17 J Conflict Security L 187. On 
terrorism, see eg O Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in 
our Time: a Twail Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171. 
112 P Alston, ‘The Security Council and human rights: lessons to be learned from the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and its 
aftermath’ (1991) 13 Australian YB Intl L 107, 107. 
113 M O’Connell, ‘Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P Mary Ellen O'Connell’ in P Cunliffe (ed), 
Responsibility to Protect: Critical Perspectives (London, Routledge, 2011).  
114 Speech given by President Dilma Rousseff during the general debate, 66th UN General Assembly Session (21 
September 2011) www.un.int/brazil/speech/11d-Pr-Dilma-Roussef-opening-of-the-66th-gerneral-assembly.html; 
E Herring, ‘From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO’s War Against Serbia and its Aftermath’ in K 
Booth (ed), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimension (Lodon, Frank Cass, 2001) 225, 229. See also 
D Levine, ‘Some Concerns about the responsibility not to veto’ (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to Protect 323. 
26 
seems to be synonymous with the expectation that international law should permit military 
intervention in more situations than it currently does. As noted, this risks increasing the 
overall level of violence and instability in the world. 
In relation to the questions posed by the editors of this volume (to what extent 
international law can address the types of security threats in the 21st Century and where 
international law might fall short in this regard), RtP suggests that international law is capable 
of addressing the security threat of atrocities, but that it currently falls short in doing so, 
particularly in relation to the authorisation of military force. In contrast with this theme, this 
chapter has suggestd that asking if international law is ‘fit for purpose’ because it does not 
permit military intervention to provide security, is asking the wrong question. International 
law does not necessarily fall short just because it does not mirror the ideas in RtP about when 
military intervention should occur and how it should be authorised.  
 
VI Conclusion  
This chapter outlined the development of the RtP doctrine and examined some problems with 
RtP’s view of the key threats to individuals and their security in the post-Cold War era. The 
problems identified were the prioritising of mass atrocity crimes over other suffering and 
death; the focus on civil and political rights abused by a local government; the assumption 
that the international community is well-placed to undertake a secondary responsibility to 
protect by assisting with conflict prevention; and the assumption that a new doctrine is 
required because existing international law is not capable of responding adequately to the 
question of intervention without Security Council authorisation. The chapter demonstrated 
these problems by highlighting an alternative understanding of the source and type of threats 
to the security of vulnerable individuals. Here the chapter explored the role of the 
international community in contributing to the insecurity of individuals across the globe, both 
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through chronic socio-economic underdevelopment in general and its role in suppressing 
national political participation and through more specific examples of international 
community policies, which contribute to the very crises to which the international community 
wants to respond. The chapter then suggested that the way RtP views crises (and the role of 
the national government and international ‘community’ of states) leads to an assumption that 
the rules on the use of force need to be revisited, such that military intervention can be 
undertaken not as a last resort and not requiring Security Council authorisation. Linking this 
to international law more generally, the chapter examined RtP’s relationship with the 
international legal regime governing peace and security and related this to general debates 
about the extent to which international law is ‘fit for purpose’ in addressing contemporary 
problems.  
The central questions of this book relate to the adequacy of international law to 
respond to contemporary security threats. This chapter has argued that RtP constructs the 
nature of threats, and so the best response to them, in such a way as to suggest that certain 
aspects of international law are not capable of responding to the security threat of mass 
atrocity crimes (chiefly, the strict procedures of the UN in relation to international peace and 
security). In its attempt to respond to this security threat, RtP addresses some of the symptoms 
of global insecurity, rather than the fundamental causes. Those who wish to do good in 
responding to situations of insecurity, and who believe that the international community has a 
responsibility towards vulnerable individuals across the globe, should therefore refocus their 
efforts on chronic conditions of poverty and inequality, both because these are important in 
their own right and because these efforts are likely to reduce the sorts of crises that RtP was 
designed to address. In relation to the human rights-state sovereignty paradigm involved in 
RtP, assuming that international law is not fit for purpose because it does not permit military 
interventions into another state is a flawed assumption. There are good reasons to limit the 
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scope of permissible military intervention. A doctrine which tries to expand the ability of 
states to use force to halt violence, without considering and addressing more fully the causes 
of such violence (in particular the role of these ‘rescuer’ states in helping create the instability 
in the first place), should be treated with caution.  
 
